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Beliefs are important forces, not only in everyday life, but also in ￿nancial markets.
Changes in beliefs shape events even if there is no change in the objective forces a⁄ecting
reality. This has long been recognized by economists in the past. Keynes (1936), for exam-
ple, wrote about "animal spirits" in￿ uencing reality and creating waves of optimism and
pessimism. In his celebrated study, "Manias, panics and crashes" Kindleberger analyzed
the way agents develop beliefs and how these beliefs move stock prices.
In recent years two sets of beliefs have emerged about the fundamental value of the
U.S. dollar. The ￿rst set has been represented, among others, by Obstfeld and Rogo⁄
(2005) and Obstfeld (2005). According to this view the large current account de￿cits of
the U.S. observed in the last years are unsustainable. A major decline in the value of the
dollar will be the consequence of adjusting the current account balance to a sustainable
level. These authors have estimated that restoring the balance in U.S., European and
Asian current accounts would imply a 30 percent depreciation of the dollar against the
Euro and a 35 percent depreciation against a basket of Asian currencies respectively.
There is another belief about the fundamental value of the dollar, though, that o⁄ers a
contrarian view to the one sketched above, e.g. Hausmann and Sturzenegger (2006). In
this alternative view there does not arise a problem of sustainability. The reason behind
this divergent views lies in a concept that the authors call "Dark Matter", i.e. attributes
present in certain assets (the U.S. dollar in this case) that can not properly be measured.
Corrected for the amount of "dark matter" these authors come to the conclusion that
there is in fact no net foreign US debt.
It is not our objective here to judge whether one view or the other is correct. There
can be little doubt, however, that these opposing beliefs about the fundamental value of
the dollar are realities that can a⁄ect the dollar exchange rate. The rational expectations
(RE) paradigm has tended to drive the analysis of these phenomena out of existence.
After all in a world where agents (i.e. a representative agent) are assumed to understand
the complexity of the world in which they live, there is no room for di⁄erent beliefs
that systematically diverge from the underlying objective reality. Beliefs are part of the
irrational world. These may be the subject of psychological analysis, not of economic
analysis.
In this paper we develop a systematic analysis of beliefs in the foreign exchange market.
2We depart from the rational expectations assumption. The fact that we depart from
rational expectations, however, does not imply that we move into a world of irrationality,
a world about which the economist has little to say. The rational expectations paradigm
lays an undue claim on the label "rational". The use of this label implies that departures
from the RE-paradigm involve irrational behavior. But this is not necessarily true. The
label "rational" in the RE-paradigm refers to an informational assumption, i.e. that
agents use the same information as the one underlying the model in which they operate.
Even though this sounds reasonable, it has the important implication that agents in the
RE-paradigm have a full understanding about how the model functions, whatever the
complexity of the model. There is now a signi￿cant body of evidence from psychology
and brain science that agents experience cognitive problems in understanding the world in
which they live; they ￿nd it hard to process the information they face and to make sense
of it. As a result, a large number of new modelling approaches that explicitly take into
account these cognitive limitations have emerged (Frankel and Froot (1998), Brock and
Hommes (1998), Lux and Marchesi (1999), Brunnemeier (2001), Kirmann and TheyssiŁre
(2002), De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006), Lux and Schornstein (2005)).
These new insights should be used in economics. The need to do so is all the stronger
as the RE-paradigm performs very poorly in empirical testing. We intend to show that
these new insights can be used without throwing away the notion of rationality. Agents
in our model will continue to be utility maximizing agents. We will assume, however,
that they do not understand the underlying model fully. Therefore they use simple rules
and develop divergent beliefs about the workings of the model. We discipline the use of
these rules by imposing a selection mechanism whereby only the most useful (pro￿table)
rules and beliefs are maintained. Thus agents are rational in that they continuously
search for the best rule and the best belief, letting relative risk adjusted pro￿tability do
the job of weeding out the bad ones. In this sense our modeling approach is immune
to the often heard criticism against the modeling of expectations outside the rational
expectations framework, i.e. that in the non-RE approach "anything can happen". Pro￿t
based selection of rules impose the necessary discipline ensuring that not "anything can
happen".
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the theo-
retical model. Section 3 shows stochastic simulations of the model. In sections 4 and 5 we
3show the results from sensitivity analysis in a deterministic and a stochastic environment
respectively. In section 6 we analyze the relevance of changes in beliefs in a stochastic
framework. In section 7 we study the relevance of divergent beliefs on the volatility of
the exchange rate. Finally, section 8 concludes.
2 Theoretical exchange rate model
In this section we present the model. It is an extension of the model in De Grauwe &
Grimaldi (2006). In that model we assumed that the fundamentalists know the funda-
mental value of the exchange rate with certainty. Here we depart from that assumption.
We assume that there are di⁄erences of opinion (di⁄erent beliefs) about the true funda-
mental. One belief is an optimistic one, i.e. it is one in which the fundamental value
is systematically overestimated; the other is a pessimistic one, i.e. it is one in which
the fundamental is systematically underestimated. Agents using a fundamentalist rule to
forecast the exchange rate choose one of these two beliefs and stick to it as long as it is
more pro￿table than the alternative1.
2.1 The optimal portfolio
We assume agents of di⁄erent types i depending on their beliefs about the future exchange
rate. Each agent can invest in two assets, a domestic (risk-free) asset and foreign (risky)















t+1 is the wealth of an agent using rule of type i to forecast the exchange rate
for period t + 1, Ei
t is the expectation operator, ￿ is the coe¢ cient of risk aversion and
V i(W i
t+1) represents the conditional variance of wealth of agent using rule i.2 The wealth
dynamics is governed by:
W
i
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where r and r￿ are respectively the domestic and the foreign interest rates (which are
known with certainty), st+1 is the exchange rate at time t+1, di;t represents the holdings
1Corrado, et al. (2007) use a similar setup assuming the existence of "bears" and "bulls". Our model
di⁄ers from theirs in the way agents choose to be bulls or bears. As will be seen, in our model bears and
bulls can coexist, which is not the case in Corrado, et al. (2007).
2The functional form of the di⁄erent forecasting rules will be speci￿ed in the next section.
4of the foreign assets by agent using rule type i at time t. Thus, the ￿rst term on the right-
hand side of equation 2 represents the value of the (risky) foreign portfolio expressed in
domestic currency at time t+1 while the second term represents the value of the (riskless)
domestic portfolio at time t + 1.3
Substituting equation 2 in 1 and maximizing the utility with respect to di;t allows us









i;t = (1 + r￿)2V i
t (st+1): The optimal holding of the foreign asset depends on the
expected excess return (corrected for risk) of the foreign asset. The market demand for
foreign assets at time t is the sum of the individual demands, i.e.:
I X
i=1
ni;tdi;t = Dt (4)
where ni;t is the number of agents using rule of type i at period t.
Market equilibrium implies that the market demand is equal to the market supply Zt
which we assume to be exogenous.5 Thus,
Zt = Dt (5)
Substituting the optimal holdings into the market demand and then into the market equi-































and " ￿t is an IID normally distributed shock to st with mean zero and variance ￿2
".
3The model could be interpreted as an asset pricing model with one risky asset (e.g. shares) and a
risk free asset. Equation (2) would then be written as
Wi
t+1 = (st+1 + yt+1)di






where st+1is the price of the share in t+1 and yt+1is the dividend per share in t+1.
4If the model is interpreted as an asset pricing model of one risky asset (shares) and a risk free asset,







5The market supply is determined by the net current account and by the sales or purchases of foreign
exchange of the central bank. We assume both to be exogenous here. In De Grauwe and Grimaldi 2006
a model with endogenized current account is presented.
5Thus the market clearing exchange rate is determined by the forecasts of the agents,
Ei
t, about the future exchange rate. Note also that the forecasts are weighted by their
respective variances ￿2
i;t. When agent￿ s i forecasts have a high variance the weight of this
agent in the determination of the market exchange rate is reduced. In the following we
will set r = r￿:
2.2 Forecasting rules
Agents can choose between two di⁄erent types of rules to forecast the exchange rate, a
fundamentalist and a chartist (extrapolative) rule. In addition, we assume an optimistic
and a pessimistic fundamentalist rule. As a result, there are three rules to choose from.
Fundamentalists6 make their forecasts by comparing last period￿ s market exchange
rate with their belief about last period￿ s fundamental exchange rate. Agents using a fun-
damentalist rule adhere to either the optimistic of the pessimistic belief. The forecasting
rule for fundamentalists is therefore given by:
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opt;t￿1 is the optimistic estimate of the fundamental exchange rate in period
t ￿ 1, s￿
pes;t￿1 is the pessimistic estimate of the fundamental exchange rate t ￿ 1, and











t￿1 ￿ a (10)
where a > 0 and s￿
t￿1 is the true, unobserved fundamental exchange rate. Thus the
optimists overestimate the true fundamental by a constant a and the pessimists underes-
timate it by the same constant. Notice that even though agents using a fundamentalist
rule have heterogeneous estimates of the value of the fundamental exchange rate, they use
6We use the term "fundamentalist" in a loose sense. It is an agent who chooses to use a fundamentalist
forecasting rule.
6a mean reverting rule to forecast the exchange rate. Put di⁄erently, if for instance agent i
using an optimistic fundamentalist rule observes that the market exchange rate exceeds (is
below) her estimate of the fundamental, s￿
fopt;t￿1; she will expect the market exchange rate
to decline (increase) towards the "fundamental" next period. The same occurs when the
agent uses the pessimistic belief about the fundamental exchange rate. The parameter  
expresses the percentage of the estimated misalignment (i.e. st￿1￿s￿
opt;t￿1;st￿1￿s￿
pes;t￿1)
expected to be corrected next period. The change in the value fundamental exchange rate
in our model can be seen as an exogenous news arrival dynamic process. We assume that
this news arrival process is IID normally distributed process, i.e. s￿
t ￿ s￿
t￿1 = ￿t
where ￿t is white noise with mean 0 and variance ￿2
￿. Notice that we have chosen an
overly simple formulae to model the degree of optimism-pessimism bias. The advantage
of adding a constant to the level of the (unobserved) fundamental exchange rate is that it
does not a⁄ect the dynamic properties of the news arrival process. As a consequence, if
any degree of non-linear dependence in the market exchange rate series is observed, it can-
not be attributed to the law of motion of both the unobserved fundamental exchange rate
or of the beliefs about it. By setting parameter a equal to zero we will analyze whether
we are able ￿nd non-linear dependence in the market exchange rate series generate by the
model in the absence of optimism-pessimism bias. Letting parameter a vary will allow us
to get an intuition of the implications for the statistical properties of the market exchange
rate of having a systematic bias in the beliefs about the underlying fundamental.7
The chartist forecasting rule is extrapolative, i.e. agents using such a rule extrapolate
past changes of the exchange rate into the future. Formally:
E
c
t [￿st+1] = ￿￿st￿1 (11)
where ￿ > 0 is the extrapolating parameter expressing the extent to which past
changes are extrapolated into the future.
Finally, equation 6 also depends on the risk of investing in the foreign portfolio. Risk
is de￿ned as the variance of the one period ahead forecast errors made by the agents.
Since agents make di⁄erent forecasts, the risks involved di⁄er. We obtain the following
7To check for robustness of our empirical results we also allowed the fundamental exchange rate to
follow a autoregressive stationary process. Since the results under both de￿nitions of the fundamental






















t [st+1] ￿ st+1)
2 (14)
2.2.1 Fitness of the rules
The next step in our analysis is to specify how agents evaluate their forecasting rules.
The general idea that we follow here is that agents choose one of the available rules,
then compare ex post the (risk adjusted) returns of the rule they have used with the
alternatives, after which they decide whether to keep the rule or to switch to another one.
Thus, our model is in the logic of evolutionary dynamics. Agents make a choice ex-ante.
Once the outcome of their choice is observable they evaluate their decision. They do this
by comparing how pro￿table their choice has been compared to alternative choices. When
they ￿nd out that the rule they have chosen is not as pro￿table as the alternatives, they
revise their decisions and change the forecasting rule by a more pro￿table one in order to
maximize the return of their portfolio. Thus the rules are subjected to a "￿tness" test.
In order to implement this idea we use the approach proposed by Brock and Hommes
(1997) which consists in making the weights of the forecasting rules a function of the





























8Here we implicitly assume that agents remember only the risk associated with the last period￿ s
decision. A memory parameter can be easily added in order to allow agents to have a longer memory
horizon. In De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006), for instance, agents￿memory is the weighted average of all
past variances and the weights are assumed to decay exponentially, i.e. agents attach a higher weight to
recent mistakes and lower weight to mistakes that lie further in the past.
9This speci￿cation of the decision rule is often used in discrete choice models. For an application
in the market for di⁄erentiated products see Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992). The idea has also



















c;t are the risk adjusted net returns made by the use of the
di⁄erent forecasting rules. Note that ￿0
opt;t = ￿opt;t ￿ ￿￿2
opt;t , ￿0
pes;t = ￿pes;t ￿ ￿￿2
pes;t:and
￿0
c;t = ￿c;t ￿ ￿￿2
c;t.
Equations 15 , 16 and 17 can be interpreted as switching rules. When the risk ad-
justed return of a particular rule increases relative to the risk adjusted return obtained
from the other rules (the denominator), then the share of agents who use that rule in-
creases, and vice versa. Notice that the switches between forecasting rules are governed
by a time-varying and endogenous mechanism. The motivation to use such a switching
mechanism is the following: agents observe their environment and react to economic vari-
ables by adjusting their behavior with a certain probability that is a function of those
economics variables. In our model, the economic variable that drives these changes in
agents￿behavior is the ex-post (risk-adjusted) return of their investment in the foreign
exchange market. The parameter ￿ measures the intensity with which agents revise their
forecasting rules. With an increasing ￿ agents react strongly to the relative return of the
rules. In the limit when ￿ goes to in￿nity all agents choose the forecasting rule which
proves to be the most pro￿table. When ￿ is equal to zero agents are insensitive to the
relative return of the rules. Thus, ￿ is a measure of inertia in the decision to switch
to the more pro￿table rule.10 As will be seen, this parameter is of great importance in
generating bubbles.
We de￿ne the return as the one-period returns of investing 1$ in the foreign asset.
More formally,
￿i;t = [st (1 + r












1 for x > 0
0 for x = 0
￿1 for x < 0
and i = opt;pes;c
Thus, when agents forecasted an increase in the exchange rate and this increase is
realized, their per unit pro￿t is equal to the observed increase in the exchange rate (cor-
rected for the interest di⁄erential). If instead the exchange rate declines, they make a per
10The psychological literature reveals that there is a lot of evidence of a ￿ status quo bias￿in decision
making (see Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1991). This implies ￿ < 1: Thus we set 0 < ￿ < 1:
9unit loss which equals this decline (because in this case they have bought foreign assets
which have declined in price).
We use a concept of return instead of pro￿ts for two reasons. First, our switching rules
of equations 16, 15 and 17 selects the ￿ttest rules. It does not select agents. Second, in
our de￿nition of returns agents only have to use publicly available information, i.e. the
forecasting rules and the observed exchange rate changes. They do not have to know their
competitor￿ s pro￿ts. Furthermore, the pro￿t obtained by taking a certain position are a
function of the amount invested which is not of public knowledge in our model. Here we
assume that every agent invests only $1 and therefore the pro￿ts are to be interpreted as
the percentage return obtained by taking a particular position.
3 Stochastic simulation of the model
Due to the strong nonlinearities of the model it is not possible to characterize its equilib-
rium and its dynamics in an analytical way. That is why we use numerical methods to do
so. We ￿rst present the results of simulating the model in the time domain. We use the
following set of parameter values that we consider to be the benchmark case: ￿2
" = 0:1,
￿2
" = 0:1, a = 4,   = 0:2 and ￿ = 0:9. We will then compare the results of this benchmark
case to other parameter values. After presenting the benchmark case we will allow for
di⁄erent levels of divergence in beliefs. In the next section we will analyze the impor-
tance of other parameters of the model. The results of the benchmark case are shown
in ￿gure 1. The upper panel of ￿gure 1 shows the simulated market exchange rate and
the optimistic and pessimistic beliefs of the fundamentalists. The lower panel shows the
weights of the optimistic and pessimistic fundamentalists. (Note that the weight of the
chartists [1 ￿ (wopt + wpes)] is not shown). Figure 1 leads to the following observations.
First, there appear to be three di⁄erent regimes in the exchange rate dynamics. There
are periods during which the exchange rate ￿ uctuates around the optimistic estimate of
the fundamental, and periods during which it ￿ uctuates around the pessimistic estimate.
During the optimistic regime we observe from the lower panel that the weights of the
optimistic fundamentalists are positive, while the weights of the pessimists are close to
zero. During the pessimistic regime we observe the opposite. There is also a third regime:
this is when the exchange rate wanders away from the both perceived fundamentals. In
the lower panel we see that in this regime the weights of both fundamentalists are close
10to zero which implies that the weight of the chartists is close to 1. Thus our model
generates endogenous waves of optimism and pessimism as well as bubbles in the foreign
exchange market. These waves come and go in an unpredictable way. We could not ￿nd
any regularity in the cyclical movements of optimism and pessimism. Once in a while,
and equally unpredictably, the exchange rate wanders away from the fundamentals. We
call this regime a non-fundamental (bubble) regime. In section we will present results
that allow us to be more precise about these di⁄erent regimes and their occurrence.
We next analyze how the divergence of opinion among fundamentalists a⁄ects the
results. We now simulate the model for two alternative values of a, i.e. a = 2 (weak
divergence of opinion) and a = 6 (strong diversion of opinion). We show the results in
￿gures 2a (weak divergence) and 2b (strong divergence). The di⁄erences are striking.
When divergence of opinion is weak we cannot clearly demarcate the optimistic and
pessimistic regimes. Instead the exchange rate ￿ uctuates rapidly from the optimistic to
the pessimistic equilibrium. This feature also shows up in the lower panel where we observe
that optimistic and pessimistic weights alternate very quickly. Notice the di⁄erence with
￿gure 2b. In this case waves of optimism and pessimism are long and protracted. Note
that in both cases non-fundamental (bubble) regimes can occur.
How can these results be interpreted? How can waves of optimism and pessimism arise
in an unpredictable ways, as shown in our model? The answer comes form the interaction
between the two di⁄erent beliefs, the existence of noise and the chartists who "feed on
noise". The story then is the following. Noise generates an unpredictable sequence of
exchange rate movements. The use of chartist (extrapolative) rules can transforms these
into sustained movements in one direction. Typically this will be a direction towards
one of the fundamental beliefs and away from the other. Thus, by pure accident, those
who follow the former belief, say the optimistic one, will start making more pro￿ts than
those who follow the latter, pessimistic, belief. As a result, the optimists will attract new
followers, while the pessimists loose adherence. The optimistic belief becomes a focal
point and a temporary new equilibrium, until a series of shocks that are strong enough
and that get reinforced by the chartist forecasting rules lead to a movement towards the
pessimistic equilibrium. It may not be clear to the reader now that these beliefs lead
to equilibrium points (attractors) but this will become clear in the next section. When
the divergence in the beliefs is weak relative to the stochastic shocks, the exchange rate
11Figure 1: Simulations in the time domain: optimism-pessimism level around
the fundamental - benchmark case
12Figure 2: Simulations in the time domain: weak vs strong optimism-pessimism
level around the fundamental
2a (weak divergence) 2b (strong divergence)
13cannot settle for long in one of the two belief equilibria and it will ￿ uctuate between
these two equilibria with a high frequency. When the divergence in the beliefs is strong,
the exchange rate can settle for a long time in the neighborhood of one of the belief
equilibria without being attracted by the other. Why don￿ t we stay then in one of these
equilibria? The answer is that the chartist rules create the potential for bubble dynamics.
This dynamics was also found in De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006). When inevitably a
bubble develops it will move the exchange rate away from the particular belief equilibrium
in which it happens to be. The bubble can then either reach the other belief equilibrium
or it will develop into a true bubble, disconnected from the fundamental and the beliefs
agents have about this fundamental.
4 Sensitivity analysis in a deterministic environment
In this section we analyze the nature of the di⁄erent equilibria and we perform a sensitivity
analysis, i.e. we study how the equilibria are a⁄ected by the di⁄erent parameters of the
model. We do this by stripping the model of its stochastics, except for the initial shock to
the exchange rate (the initial conditions). We set the true fundamental value s￿
t = 0: As
a result, the exchange rate can be interpreted as a deviation from its fundamental value.
We ￿rst show the result of simulating the model for di⁄erent initial values and for
di⁄erent values of the degree of divergence in beliefs (2a). We show the results in ￿gure
3. On the x-axis we have the initial values of the exchange rate. These can be positive or
negative because we can start the simulation with an exchange rate that is above or below
the fundamental value. The y-axis shows the increasing levels of divergence in beliefs. On
the vertical axis we plot the equilibrium value of the exchange rate. This is the ￿xed
point to which the exchange rate converges after having been shocked initially. We can
now interpret the results as follows. We start with low values of divergence (we are close
to 0 on the y-axis). We then observe that for su¢ ciently small initial shocks, the exchange
rate converges to zero (the fundamental value). When the initial shock is large enough
the exchange rate will not converge to zero but to a positive, or negative number, and it
will stay there. These are the non-fundamental attractors in the model. In a stochastic
environment they lead to the occurrence of bubbles. This feature was also found in De
Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) and was explained there.
Let us now move along the y-axis. The degree of divergence increases. At some point
14we reach a bifurcation. We now obtain two fundamental equilibria. They correspond to
the optimistic and the pessimistic belief equilibria identi￿ed in the previous section. Note
the interesting feature that at the point of bifurcation the true fundamental ( s￿
t = 0)
ceases to act as an attractor and the beliefs take over this function. We also note that as
we move along the y-axis the area of non-fundamental (bubble) equilibria shrinks. Finally
we also observe that the boundary between the fundamental equilibria (whether real or
beliefs) and the bubble equilibria is discontinuous.
Figure 3: Deterministic simulations: sensitivity to optimism-pessimism level
and initial conditions
We now present additional results in which we allow other parameters of the model
to change. In ￿gures 4a and 4b we show the results of simulations in which we allow the
parameter ￿ (the extrapolation parameter of chartists) to vary.
Figure 4: Deterministic simulation: sensitivity to beta and initial conditions
4a 4b
15We also distinguish between two cases, a low divergence in beliefs case (left panel) and
a high divergence in beliefs case. Take the case of low divergence ￿rst. We observe that
as ￿ increases, the surface collecting the fundamental equilibria shrinks and the surface
of non-fundamental equilibria increases. Thus, when the extrapolation parameter is high,
small initial disturbances lead the exchange rate towards a non-fundamental equilibrium.
Note that in this case of low divergence in beliefs, the true fundamental (s￿ = 0) acts an
attractor. This feature contrasts with the results obtained in the right hand panel. There
we ￿nd two fundamental attractors, the optimistic belief attractor (which is positive) and
the pessimistic belief attractor (which is negative). Depending on the initial shock the
exchange rate will settle either in the optimistic or in the pessimistic attractors. As in the
left hand panel we ￿nd that the surface of these fundamental attractors shrinks with an
increasing ￿:
A ￿nal sensitivity analysis is presented in ￿gures 5a and 5b. We now allow the parame-
ter ￿ to change. This is the "intensity of choice" parameter that regulates the switching
behavior. A high ￿ implies that changes in relative pro￿tability of forecasting rules have
a strong in￿ uence on agents￿willingness to switch from one rule to another. We show as
before the cases of low and high divergences in beliefs. We ￿nd that as agents become
more willing to switch (high ￿) the surface of fundamental equilibria shrinks and the
surface of bubble equilibria expands. Note that when ￿ = 0 we obtain only fundamental
equilibria. This is a situation in which agents keep the same forecasting rule whatever
its pro￿tability. We also observe that in the high divergence case a small positive value
of ￿ is su¢ cient to generate two fundamental equilibria (an optimistic and a pessimistic
belief equilibrium). When the divergence is small we need large values of ￿ to reach a
bifurcation point.
We observe form ￿gure 5a that there are regions where the border between di⁄erent
types of equilibrium is complex. We illustrate this in ￿gure 6 by "taking a slice" at a
value of gamma = 3.5. We then obtain a two dimensional picture showing the attractors
for di⁄erent initial conditions and for the same gamma = 3.5.
We now observe that small di⁄erences in the initial conditions can lead the exchange
rate to be attracted by a very di⁄erent equilibrium point. This feature is made even
clearer by blowing up ￿gure 6. We then obtain ￿gure 7. We observe that a very small
displacement in the initial condition can lead the attractor to jump from a positive to
16Figure 5: Deterministic simulations: sensitivity to gamma and initial conditions
5a 5b
Figure 6: Deterministic simulations: sensitivity to initial conditions
17Figure 7: Deterministic simulations: sensitivity to initial conditions
a negative number and vice versa. This feature suggests that the boundary between the
two equilibria is fractal in nature. This feature has an important implication, i.e. in a
stochastic environment it leads to sensitivity of the future time path of the exchange rate
to initial conditions. We analyze this further in the next section.
5 Sensitivity to initial conditions in a stochastic en-
vironment
The nonlinearities and the discontinuities in the model create a potential for "sensitivity
to initial conditions". We analyze this feature as follows. We simulate the model in
the time domain assuming two di⁄erent initial conditions for the exchange rate. The
di⁄erence in the initial conditions is set at 0.1. The rest of the stochastics is identical
in the two simulations. Thus, the stochastic realizations of the fundamental variable and
the noise terms in the exchange rate equation are identical. We show two examples of
such simulations in ￿gures 8a (a = 2) and 8b (a = 6).
We observe that a small di⁄erence in the initial conditions can create periods during
which the two exchange rates exhibit a completely di⁄erent time pattern, with di⁄erent
waves of optimism and pessimism, and di⁄erent occurrences of bubbles. Thus it appears
that small di⁄erences in the initial conditions can create a di⁄erent "history" of the
exchange rate. This di⁄erent historical pattern is not the result of di⁄erences in the
underlying fundamental variable. It results from the fact that the small di⁄erence in the
18Figure 8: Sensitivity to initial conditions in the time domain
8a 8b
initial conditions is su¢ cient to move the exchange rate to a di⁄erent fundamental belief
equilibrium. This then leads to di⁄erent waves of optimism and pessimism and possibly
to di⁄erent bubbles. For the outside observer it appears that the exchange rate is driven
by di⁄erent fundamental variable. It will not be surprising that in the world we describe
here the outside observer will be tempted to develop quite di⁄erent stories about the
underlying fundamental.
The "sensitivity to initial conditions" does not appear as a feature in all simulations.
We found that in many simulations the two exchange rates converge to exactly the same
time path. In order to ￿nd out the frequency of the occurrence of sensitivity to initial con-
ditions, we repeated the simulations many times. In addition, we checked the importance
of some parameter values in generating sensitivity to initial conditions. We show the re-
sults in ￿gures 9a and 9b. The horizontal axis shows increasing values of ￿ (the switching
parameter). For each value of ￿ we performed 100 simulations of 10,000 periods each and
counted the number of times sensitivity to initial conditions occurred. Each point shows
the percentage of time this was the case. The left hand side panel shows the results for
the intermediate level of divergence in beliefs (a = 2) and the right hand side panel for a
high level of divergence (a = 6): We observe that the occurrence of sensitivity to initial
conditions increases with ￿. Thus the more agents are willing to switch to another rule in
response to changes in relative pro￿tability the more often sensitivity to initial conditions
will be observed. The di⁄erent divergence of opinions does not alter this result11.
11We tested for other levels of divergence. The results were not a⁄ected.
19Figure 9: Percentage of times exchange rate series show di⁄erent paths due to
a di⁄erent initial shock conditional on gamma
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6 Sensitivity to changes in beliefs
The model also produces a strong sensitivity to changes in the beliefs about the underlying
fundamental. We show this feature by simulating the model assuming a small change in
a keeping the parameter gamma constant at the value of 5. In the base simulation we
set a = 2. We compare the results with a simulation where we have set set a = 2:1: The
stochastics is identical in the two simulations, i.e. the initial conditions and the stochastic
realizations of the fundamental are the same. An example of such a simulation is shown in
￿gure 10. We observe that a slight change in the beliefs about the underlying fundamental
can have the e⁄ect of changing the future history of the exchange rate in a substantial
way, with di⁄erent waves of optimism and pessimism.
Figure 11 shows the results when the change in beliefs is assumed to be stronger (but
still relatively modest). We now set a = 2 in the base simulation and a = 3 in the shock
simulation. The divergences in the time path of the exchange rates are spectacular. It
now appears to the outsider that the two exchange rates are often driven by very di⁄erent
fundamentals. This, however, is not the case. What drives these divergences is a relatively
small di⁄erence in the beliefs of the agents about the underlying fundamental.
We tested the frequency of these divergences (as in ￿gures 9a and 9b) by computing
the number of times the two exchange rate series deviated from each other. As in ￿gure
9 we did that for di⁄erent values of ￿. For each value of ￿ we performed 100 simulations
of 10,000 periods each and computed the percentage of times the exchange rate devia-
20Figure 10: Sensitivity to the fundamental belief in the time domain
Figure 11: Sensitivity to the fundamental belief in the time domain
21tions exceeded 1. The results are shown in ￿gures 12a and 12b. We now ￿nd that these
divergences are observed most of the time. Thus relatively small changes in beliefs have
profound e⁄ects on the time path of the exchange rate even when the underlying funda-
mental is not a⁄ected. Put di⁄erently, changes in beliefs have powerful e⁄ects independent
from changes in the "underlying reality" that drives the exchange rate.
Figure 12: Percentage of times di⁄erent levels of optimism-pessimism generate
di⁄erent paths of the exchange rate conditional on gamma
12a 12b
7 Empirical testing
In this section we analyze if our exchange rate model is capable of replicating the stylized
facts typically observed in foreign exchange market data. Our main focus will be on the
distribution of the exchange rate returns (fatness of the tails), unit root properties of the
exchange rate and ARCH e⁄ects.
7.1 Fat tails
There is a large empirical literature documenting the existence of fat tails and excess
kurtosis in the foreign exchange markets. (For a survey see De Grauwe and Grimaldi
(2006)). We analyze whether our model is capable of replicating this ￿nding. In order to
do so, we simulated our model for di⁄erent values of the divergence of beliefs parameters
and computed the kurtosis and the Hill index (which is often used as a measure of fat
tails)12. We repeated each simulation 100 times and report the median kurtosis and the
12In De Grauwe and Grimaldi(2006) we performed a similar analysis allowing other parameters of the
model to change.
22median Hill index. We show the results in table 1.
The ￿rst column shows the di⁄erent values of the parameter a measuring the divergence
of beliefs. We let this parameter increase from 0 (no divergence) to 12. The second column
shows the median kurtosis. The median is obtained from 100 simulations each of 10,000
periods. We observe that for all values of the divergence of belief parameter we obtain
excess kurtosis, i.e. the concentration of the returns around the mean is too high to be
represented by a normal distribution (the kurtosis of a normal distribution is 3). The same
phenomenon has been observed in the real data. We observe a hump shaped behavior
of the kurtosis, i.e. it increases ￿rst with the value of the divergence parameter and then
tends to decline for large values.
The last three columns show the Hill index using di⁄erent cuto⁄ points of the tail.
This index measures the fatness degree of the tails of the distribution of the exchange
rate returns. The values obtained correspond to those obtained in the empirical literature
(see Koedijk, et al. (1992)). We observe a similar hump shaped pattern, i.e. when the
divergence of beliefs starts increasing the Hill indices decline ￿rst, but then increase after
some su¢ ciently large value of divergence. We have found the same results for a large
set of values of the parameters of the model. In appendix we show some representative
histograms of the returns obtained under di⁄erent assumptions of divergence of beliefs.
These results lead to the following interpretation. First our model is capable of repli-
cating a widely observed phenomenon, i.e. that exchange rate returns exhibit excess kur-
tosis and fat tails. Second, the emergence of divergence in beliefs tends to make the tails
of the distribution of the returns fatter, and leads to more density around the mean .
This e⁄ect is the strongest when divergence is not too high. The interpretation of these
results is the following. When the exchange rate moves around one particular type of
equilibrium, volatility is low. The existence of divergence of beliefs, however, leads to
regular switches from one type of equilibrium to another. These switches coincide with
greater turbulence and extreme changes in the exchange rate. When the divergence of
beliefs is very high, these switches become less frequent (as was illustrated in section 3).
A more intuitive way to interpret these results is as follows. Volatility is low when there
is a consensus of beliefs about the fundamental. Exchange rate changes are then relatively
low. At some point, due to stochastic shocks, this consensus unravels. As a consequence,
the market starts searching for a new consensus about the fundamental exchange rate.
23That is the time when turbulence sets in and volatility increases. Until a new consensus
emerges.
Table 1: Empirical ￿ndings: probability distribution of returns
Divergence Beliefs Med Kurtosis 2.5% tail 5% tail 10% tail
0 4.32 5.73 5.16 4.31
2 6.00 3.93 3.98 3.74
4 9.39 3.25 3.60 3.48
6 9.61 3.83 4.02 3.68
8 4.79 4.58 4.32 3.95
10 4.68 4.91 4.75 4.11
12 4.85 4.96 4.73 4.11
Median values are computed out of 100 samples of 10000 observations each
Parameter values: gamma = 3, initial shock = -2, beta = 0.9
Median Hill index
7.2 Unit root of exchange rate level
The empirical evidence about exchange rates overwhelmingly shows that exchange rates
follow a unit root process. We now turn to the question of whether the exchange rate
series generated by our model can be described by a unit root process. Formally, when
de￿ning the exchange rate level as st = ￿st￿1 +"t, where "t is a stationary process, one is
normally not able to reject the hypothesis of ￿ being equal to 1. To test this hypothesis we
simulate the model for a given level of divergence of beliefs over 10000 thousand periods
and perform the Dicky-Fuller unit root test. To make sure that our results are not driven
by a particular stochastic simulation we repeat the experiment 100 times and then we
compute the number of times the test rejects the null hypothesis of a = 1. The results
are reported in table 2.
Table 2: Empirical ￿ndings: unit root test
UR test (n° rejections)
Divergence Beliefs Low High alpha = 5%
0 0.99989 1.00077 0
2 0.99981 1.00048 0
4 0.99982 1.00039 0
6 0.99990 1.00063 0
8 0.99987 1.00048 0
10 0.99988 1.00042 0
12 0.99994 1.00040 0
Values computed out of 100 samples of 10000 observations each
Parameter values: gamma = 3, initial shock = -2, beta = 0.9
Range AR coefficient
Our results do not reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in the exchange rate level.
24In table 2 we also report the lowest and the highest value of the estimated autoregressive
coe¢ cient of the exchange rate model speci￿ed above throughout the 100 repetitions.
Judging by the low level of divergence in the estimated parameter range one can be
con￿dent about the accuracy of this ￿nding. Also interesting is that the unit root property
of the spot exchange rate level generated by the model does not depend upon the degree
of divergence of beliefs.
7.3 ARCH e⁄ects
Finally we analyze whether in our model periods of high and low exchange rate volatility
tend to cluster. This clustering of volatility has been widely observed in foreign exchange
markets (see De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006)). The typical statistical framework used to
study this non-linear dependency of ￿nancial market data is the Autoregressive Condi-
tional Heteroskedastic (ARCH) model. We de￿ne the following an ARCH(1,1) model:
￿st = c + "t
￿
2
";t = d + ￿￿
2
";t￿1 + ￿t
where ￿t is an normally distributed IID process with E [￿t] = 0 and E [￿2
t] = ￿2
￿.
As in the two previous exercises, we simulate the model 100 times over 10000 periods
for a given value of divergence of beliefs. Each time we perform both the ARCH test and
Ljung-Box test. On table 3 we report the number of times that the null-hypothesis of no
ARCH e⁄ects is rejected.
Table 3: Empirical ￿ndings: ARCH e⁄ects
GARCH test (n° of rejections) LB-test (n° of rejections)








Values computed out of 100 samples of 10000 observations each
Parameter values: gamma = 3, initial shock = -2, beta = 0.9
Overall both tests reject the null of no ARCH e⁄ects independently of the degree of
divergence of beliefs.
25Throughout the analysis of the three stylized facts that we have studied in this section
we have been particularly careful in also considering the case of no divergence in beliefs.
In doing so, we show that our results are not driven by the inclusion of a belief bias with
respect to the fundamental. In other words, we are able to replicate all the empirical
stylized facts present in the foreign exchange market data both in the presence and in the
absence of divergence of beliefs. Furthermore, in the analysis of the distributions of the
returns around its mean we analyze the relevance of increasing the degree of divergence
in beliefs.
8 Conclusion
Uncertainty about how the economy functions leads to divergences in beliefs. This was
very well illustrated in recent years when two sets of beliefs emerged about the fundamen-
tal value of the dollar. According to one school of thought, represented by among others,
Obstfeld and Rogo⁄, the unsustainable current account de￿cits of the US would lead to
a major decline of the dollar. For these believers the fundamental value of the dollar
was way below the market value. Another school of thought (represented by Hausmann
and Sturzenegger) had it that there is no problem with US current account de￿cits and
foreign debt because in fact if correctly measured, there is no net foreign debt. Fore these
believers the fundamental value of the dollar was high enough so that no adjustment in
the market rate was called for.
In this paper we have modeled how the existence of di⁄erent beliefs about the un-
derlying fundamental value of the currency a⁄ects the dynamics of the exchange rate.
We found that a divergence of beliefs creates the potential for waves of optimism and
pessimism that alternate in an unpredictable way. These waves are disconnected from
the underlying (objective) fundamental value. We also found that in such a world there
is "sensitivity to initial conditions", i.e. small changes in beliefs can fundamentally alter
the time path of the exchange rate. Finally, divergence of beliefs creates regime switches
when one belief consensus about the fundamental unravels and the market searches for a
new consensus. During these periods of regime switching, turbulences sets in and large
changes in the exchange rates occur.
26Appendix: Histograms of returns under di⁄erent be-
liefs
Figure 13: Empirical ￿ndings: probability distribution of returns
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